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Abstract. Robust Stable Marriage (RSM) is a variant of the classical
Stable Marriage problem, where the robustness of a given stable match-
ing is measured by the number of modifications required for repairing
it in case an unforeseen event occurs. We focus on the complexity of
finding an (a, b)-supermatch. An (a, b)-supermatch is defined as a stable
matching in which if any a (non-fixed) men/women break up it is pos-
sible to find another stable matching by changing the partners of those
a men/women and also the partners of at most b others. In order to
show deciding if there exists an (a, b)-supermatch is NP-complete, we
first introduce a SAT formulation that is NP-complete by using Schae-
fer’s Dichotomy Theorem. Then, we show the equivalence between the
SAT formulation and finding a (1, 1)-supermatch on a specific family of
instances.
1 Introduction
Matching under preferences is a multidisciplinary family of problems, mostly
studied by the researchers in the field of economics and computer science. There
are many variants of the matching problems such as College Admission, Hospi-
tal/Residents, Stable Marriage, Stable Roommates, etc.The reader is referred to
the book written by Manlove for a comprehensive background on the subject [1].
Current studies in the literature indicate that different robustness notions for
different matching problems are being studied. To the best of our knowledge, the
very first robustness notion in matching problems is studied on the Geometric
Stable Roommates problem [2]. Later on, there appear a few research papers on
robustly stable mechanisms in matching markets [3,4,5]. The most recent notions
are proposed in Stable Marriage problem, where one of them uses a probability
model and a social cost function to measure robustness [6], and the other one
uses a cost function to calculate repair costs of each stable matching and use it
as a measure of robustness [7].
We work on the robustness notion of stable matching proposed by Genc et.
al. [7]. In the context of Stable Marriage, the purpose is to find a matching M be-
tween men and women such that no pair 〈man,woman〉 prefer each other to their
situations in M . The authors of [7] introduced the notion of (a, b)-supermatch
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as a measure of robustness. An (a, b)-supermatch is a stable matching such that
if any a agents (men or woman) break up it is possible to find another stable
matching by changing the partners of those a agents with also changing the
partners of at most b others. This notion is inspired by the work of Ginsberg
et al. on (a, b)-supermodels in Boolean Satisfiability [8], and (a, b)-super solu-
tions in CSP by Hebrard et.al. [9,10,11]. Both finding an (a, b)-supermodel and
an (a, b)-super solution are shown to be NP-complete. However, they leave the
complexity of this problem open [7].
The focus of this paper is to study the complexity of finding an (a, b)-
supermatch. In order to show that the general case of RSM, which is the decision
of existence of an (a, b)-supermatch, is NP-complete, it is sufficient to show that
a restricted version of the general problem is NP-complete. Thus, we first show
that the decision problem for finding a (1, 1)-supermatch on a restricted family
of instances is NP-complete, then we generalize this complexity result to the
general case.
Figure 1 illustrates the hierarchy between different cases of finding an (a, b)-
supermatch.
Fig. 1. Illustration of the complexity hierarchy between the different cases of RSM.
In Section 2, the notations and the basics of the Stable Marriage problem are
introduced, then we refer to some theorems that are already present in the liter-
ature. In Section 3, we describe a restricted family of Stable Marriage instances.
In Section 4, after defining a specific SAT formulation based on the properties of
the restricted family, we show by reduction that the decision version of finding
an (1, 1)-supermatch is NP-complete.
2 Notations & Background
An instance of the Stable Marriage problem (with incomplete lists) takes as input
a set of men U = {m1,m2, . . . ,mn1} and a set of women W = {w1, w2, . . . , wn2}
where each person has an ordinal preference list over members of the opposite
sex. For the sake of simplicity we suppose in the rest of the paper that n1 = n2. A
pair 〈mi, wj〉 is acceptable if wj (respectively mi) appears in the preference list
of mi (respectively wj). A matching is a set of acceptable pairs where each man
(respectively woman) appears at most once in any pair of M . If 〈mi, wj〉 ∈ M ,
we say that wj (respectively mi) is the partner of mi (respectively wj) and then
we denote M(mi) = wj and M(wj) = mi. A pair 〈mi, wj〉 (sometimes denoted
as 〈i, j〉) is said to be blocking a matching M if mi prefers wj to M(mi) and wj
prefers mi to M(wj). A matching M is called stable if there exists no blocking
pair for M . A pair 〈mi, wj〉 is said to be stable if it appears in a stable matching.
The stable matching, in which each man is matched to their most preferred stable
partner is called the man-optimal matching and denoted by M0. A pair 〈mi, wj〉
is called fixed if 〈mi, wj〉 appears in every stable matching. In this case, the man
mi and woman wj are called fixed. In the rest of the paper we use n to denote
the number of non-fixed men and I to denote an instance of a Stable Marriage
problem. We measure the distance between two stable matchings Mi,Mj by the
number of men that have different partners in Mi and Mj , denoted by d(Mi,Mj).
Formally, a stable matching M is said to be (a, b)-supermatch if for any set
Ψ ⊂ M of a stable pairs that are not fixed, there exists a stable matching M ′
such that M ′ ∩ Ψ = ∅ and d(M,M ′)− a ≤ b [7].
Definition 1 (pi1) INPUT: a, b ∈ N, and a Stable Marriage instance I.
QUESTION: Is there an (a, b)-supermatch for I?
Let M be a stable matching. A rotation ρ = (〈mk0 , wk0〉, 〈mk1 , wk1〉, . . . ,
〈mkl−1 , wkl−1〉) (where l ∈ N∗) is an ordered list of pairs in M such that changing
the partner of each man mki to the partner of the next man mki+1 (the operation
+1 is modulo l) in the list ρ leads to a stable matching denoted by M/ρ. The
latter is said to be obtained after eliminating ρ from M . In this case, we say
that 〈mli , wli〉 is eliminated by ρ, whereas 〈mli , wli+1〉 is produced by ρ, and
that ρ is exposed on M . If a pair 〈mi, wj〉 appears in a rotation ρ, we denote
it by 〈mi, wj〉 ∈ ρ. Additionally, if a man mi appears at least in one of the
pairs in the rotation ρ, we say mi is involved in ρ. There exists a partial order
for rotations. A rotation ρ′ is said to precede another rotation ρ (denoted by
ρ′ ≺≺ ρ), if ρ′ is eliminated in every sequence of eliminations that starts at M0
and ends at a stable matching in which ρ is exposed [12]. Note that this relation
is transitive, that is, ρ′′ ≺≺ ρ′ ∧ ρ′ ≺≺ ρ =⇒ ρ′′ ≺≺ ρ. Two rotations are said
to be incomparable if none of them precede the other.
The structure that represents all rotations and their partial order is a directed
graph called rotation poset denoted by Π = (V, E). Each rotation corresponds
to a vertex in V and there exists an edge from ρ′ to ρ if ρ′ precedes ρ. There
are two different edge types in a rotation poset: type 1 and type 2 . Suppose
〈mi, wj〉 is in rotation ρ, if ρ′ is the unique rotation that moves mi to wj then
(ρ′, ρ) ∈ E and ρ′ is called a type 1 predecessor of ρ. If ρ moves mi below wj ,
and ρ′ 6= ρ is the unique rotation that moves wj above mi, then (ρ′, ρ) ∈ E and
ρ′ is called a type 2 predecessor of ρ [12]. A node that has no outgoing edges is
called a leaf node and a node that has no incoming edges is called root node.
A closed subset S is a set of rotations such that for any rotation ρ in S,
if there exists a rotation ρ′ that precedes ρ then ρ′ is also in S. Every closed
subset in the rotation poset corresponds to a stable matching [12]. Let L(S) be
the set of rotations that are the leaf nodes of the graph induced by the rotations
in S. Similarly, let N(S) be the set of the rotations that are not in S, but all of
their predecessors are in S. This can be illustrated as having a cut in the graph
Π, where the cut divides Π into two sub-graphs, namely Π1 and Π2. If there
are any comparable nodes between Π1 and Π2, Π1 is the part that contains the
preceding rotations. Eventually, Π1 corresponds to the closed subset S, L(S)
corresponds to the leaf nodes of Π1 and N(S) corresponds to the root nodes of
Π2.
An important remark is that there is a 1-1 correspondence between the
matchings in I and the sets of incomparable rotations in V. A closed sub-
set is defined by adding all predecessors of each node in the subset to the subset.
Equivalently, if all rotations that precede some other rotations in S are removed
from S, the resulting set corresponds to a set of incomparable nodes, namely
L(S).
Predecessors of a rotation ρ in a rotation poset are denoted by N−(ρ) and
successors are denoted by N+(ρ). We also denote by X(R) the set of men in-
volved in a set of rotations R.
Let us illustrate these terms on a sample SM instance specified by the pref-
erence lists of 7 men/women in Table 1 given by Genc et. al [7]. For the sake
of clarity, each man mi is denoted with i and each woman wj with j. Figure 2
represents the rotation poset and all the rotations associated with this sample.
m0 0 6 5 2 4 1 3 w0 2 1 6 4 5 3 0
m1 6 1 4 5 0 2 3 w1 0 4 3 5 2 6 1
m2 6 0 3 1 5 4 2 w2 2 5 0 4 3 1 6
m3 3 2 0 1 4 6 5 w3 6 1 2 3 4 0 5
m4 1 2 0 3 4 5 6 w4 4 6 0 5 3 1 2
m5 6 1 0 3 5 4 2 w5 3 1 2 6 5 4 0
m6 2 5 0 6 4 3 1 w6 4 6 2 1 3 0 5
Table 1. Preference lists for men
(left) and women (right) for a sam-
ple instance of size 7.
Table 2. Rotation poset of the in-
stance given in Table 1.
All the stable matchings of the instance given in Figure 2 are listed in Table 3.
For the sake of example, the stable matching M2 has the corresponding closed
subset S2, which is composed of the rotations {ρ0, ρ1}, and it is obtained by
exposing the rotation ρ1 on M1, also denoted by M2 = M1/ρ1 = {(0, 2), (1, 5),
(2, 6), (3, 3), (4, 1), (5, 4), (6, 0)}. For M2, the leaf and neighbor nodes can be iden-
tified as L(S2) = {ρ1} and N(S2) = {ρ2, ρ4}.
2.1 Schaefer’s Dichotomy Theorem for Satisfiability
The original Schaefer’s dichotomy theorem is proposed in [13]. In this section,
we use the same terminology and notations as in [14]. A literal is a Boolean
Stable Matching Pairs
M0 {(0, 5), (1, 4), (2, 6), (3, 3), (4, 1), (5, 0), (6, 2)}
M1 = M0/ρ0 {(0, 2), (1, 4), (2, 6), (3, 3), (4, 1), (5, 0), (6, 5)}
M2 = M1/ρ1 {(0, 2), (1, 5), (2, 6), (3, 3), (4, 1), (5, 4), (6, 0)}
M3 = M2/ρ4 {(0, 2), (1, 5), (2, 0), (3, 3), (4, 1), (5, 4), (6, 6)}
M4 = M3/ρ5 {(0, 2), (1, 3), (2, 0), (3, 5), (4, 1), (5, 4), (6, 6)}
M5 = M2/ρ2 {(0, 4), (1, 5), (2, 6), (3, 3), (4, 1), (5, 2), (6, 0)}
M6 = M5/ρ4 = M3/ρ2 {(0, 4), (1, 5), (2, 0), (3, 3), (4, 1), (5, 2), (6, 6)}
M7 = M4/ρ2 = M6/ρ5 {(0, 4), (1, 3), (2, 0), (3, 5), (4, 1), (5, 2), (6, 6)}
M8 = M5/ρ3 {(0, 1), (1, 5), (2, 6), (3, 3), (4, 4), (5, 2), (6, 0)}
M9 = M6/ρ3 = M8/ρ4 {(0, 1), (1, 5), (2, 0), (3, 3), (4, 4), (5, 2), (6, 6)}
M10 = M7/ρ3 = M9/ρ5 {(0, 1), (1, 3), (2, 0), (3, 5), (4, 4), (5, 2), (6, 6)}
Table 3. The list of all stable matchings for the instance given in Figure 2.
variable or its negation. A clause is a disjunction of literals. If x is a Boolean
variable, then the literal x is called positive and the literal ¬x is called negative.
We shall use the term formula to say a Boolean formula given in a conjunctive
normal form (CNF) as a finite set of clauses.
A formula is called Horn (respectively dual-Horn) if every clause in this
formula contains a positive (respectively negative) literal. A linear equation over
the 2-element field is an expression of the form x1 ⊕ x2 . . .⊕ xk = δ where ⊕ is
the sum modulo 2 operator and δ is 0 or 1. An affine formula is a conjunction
of linear equations over the 2-element field.
An assignment is a mapping from (Boolean) variables to {true, false}. An
assignment A is said to satisfy a clause C if and only if there exists a vari-
able x such that C contains x and the assignment of x by A is true or C
contains ¬x and the assignment of x by A is false. A Boolean Constraint of
arity k is a function φ : {true, false}k → {true, false}. Let (x1, . . . xk) be a
sequence of Boolean variables and φ be a Boolean constraint of arity k. The pair
〈φ, (x1, . . . xk)〉 is called a constraint application. An assignment A to (x1, . . . xk)
satisfies 〈φ, (x1, . . . xk)〉 if φ evaluates to true on the truth values assigned by A.
Let Φ be a set of constraint applications, and A be an assignment to all variables
occurring in Φ. A is said to be a satisfying assignment of Φ if A satisfies every
constraint application in A.
Let C be a set of Boolean constraints. SAT (C) is defined as the following
decision problem: Given a finite set Φ of constraints applications from C, is there
a satisfying assignment for Φ?
Theorem 1. Dichotomy Theorem for Satisfiability [14,13]. Let C be a set of
Boolean constraints. If C satisfies at least one of the conditions (a)-(f) below,
then SAT (C) is in P. Otherwise, SAT (C) is NP-complete.
a) Every constraint in C evaluates to true if all assignments are true.
b) Every constraint in C evaluates to true if all assignments are false.
c) Every constraint in C can be expressed as a Horn formula.
d) Every constraint in C can be expressed as a dual-Horn formula.
e) Every constraint in C can be expressed as affine formula.
f) Every constraint in C can be expressed as a 2-CNF formula.
3 A specific problem family
In this section, we describe a restricted, specific family F of Stable Marriage
instances over properties on its generic rotation poset ΠF = (VF , EF ).
Property 1 Each rotation ρi ∈ VF , contains exactly 2 pairs ρi = (〈mi1, wi1〉,
〈mi2, wi2〉).
Property 2 Each rotation ρi ∈ VF , has at most 2 predecessors and at most 2
successors.
Property 3 Each edge ei ∈ EF , is a type 1 edge.
Property 4 For each man mi, i ∈ [1, n], mi is involved in at least 2 rotations.
Figure 2 illustrates these properties. Note that, the ordering of the pairs is
not important as there exist only two pairs in each rotation.
Fig. 2. An illustration of the men/women included in rotations for cases where a rota-
tion has exactly 1 predecessor and 1 successor (A,B), 1 predecessor and 2 successors,
which is also similar to 1 successor and 2 predecessors (C), 2 predecessors and 2 suc-
cessors (D).
We would like to remark the difference between the cases A and B in Figure 2.
Due to Property 3, any two rotations that have an edge between, contain a man
and a woman in common. When the case is generalized to 3 rotations ρp1−ρ−ρs1,
it should be noted that those three rotations either contain the same man mi
but contain different women, wb between ρp1 and ρ, but wc between ρ and ρs1
as in the case A or the same woman in all three rotations but different men mi
between ρp1 and ρ, but mk between ρ and ρs1 as in the case B.
Lemma 1. For each two different paths P1 and P2 defined on ΠF , where both
start at rotation ρs, end at ρt, and the pair 〈me, wf 〉 ∈ ρs, if all rotations on
P1 (respectively P2) contain me, at least one of the rotations on P2 (respectively
P1) does not contain wf .
Proof. Suppose for contradiction that me is involved in all rotations on P1 and
wf is involved in all rotations on P2. This scenario is likely to occur as the Prop-
erty 3 indicates that all edges are of type 1, which is also easy to observe on the
Figure 2, any two rotations connected by an edge in the rotation poset always
contain a man, and a woman in common. In this case, because of the supposition,
the me and wf are carried on to the rotation ρt, the pair 〈me, wf 〉 is reproduced.
In other words, exposing ρt on a stable matching produces the pair 〈me, wf 〉.
However, this pair is already eliminated by ρs, meaning this couple is already
produced. The supposition contradicts the fact that exposing rotations on stable
matchings causes men to be matched with their less preferred partners, and if a
couple is eliminated once can not be produced again.
Definition 2 (piF1 ) A particular case of pi1, with the restrictions from problem
family F.
Definition 3 (pi2) The special case of pi1, where a = 1, b = 1.
Definition 4 (piF2 ) INPUT: A Stable Marriage instance I from family F.
QUESTION: Is there a (1, 1)-supermatch for I?
4 Complexity results
In order to prove that the general problem pi1 is NP-complete, we show that the
restricted family problem piF1 is NP-complete. And in order to do this, we first
prove it for a particular case noted piF2 by introducing an NP-complete SAT
formulation denoted by SAT-SM.
4.1 NP-completeness
SAT-SM takes as input a set of integers χ = [1, |χ|], n, n ∈ N∗ lists l1, l2, . . . , ln
where each list is an ordered list of integers of χ, and three sets of distinct
Boolean variables Y = {ye | e ∈ χ}, S = {se | e ∈ χ}, and P = {pe | e ∈ χ}}.
Conditions on the lists: The lists l1, . . . , ln are subject to the following con-
straints: First, each list ∀a ∈ [1, n], la = (χa1 , . . . , χakla ), where kla = |la| ≥ 2.
Second, each element of χ appears in exactly two different lists. For illustration,
the set χ represents the indexes of rotations and a list la represents the index
of each rotation having the man ma. The order in la specifies the path in the
rotation poset from the first rotation to the last one for a man ma. And the
restriction for having each index in two different lists is related to Property 1.
In addition to those two conditions, we have the following rule over the lists:
[Rule 1] For any χmi and χ
m
j from the same list lm where m ∈ [1, n] and j > i,
there does not exist any sequence S that starts at χmi and ends at χ
m
j constructed
by iterating the two consecutive rules σ and θ below:
– given χae ∈ S, the next element in S is χae+1, where e+ 1 ≤ kla .
– given χae ∈ S, the next element in S is χbf , where χae = χbf , a 6= b ∈ [1, n],
and 1 ≤ f ≤ klb .
Conditions on the clauses: The CNF that defines SAT-SM is a conjunction of
four groups of clauses: A , B , C and D . The groups are subject to the following
conditions:
A : For any list la = (χ
a
1 , . . . , χ
a
kla
), we have a disjunction between the Y -
elements and the P -elements as
∨kla
i=1 yχai ∨ pχai .
A is defined by
n∧
a=1
kla∨
i=1
yχa
i
∨ pχa
i
. (1)
B : For any list la = (χ
a
1 , . . . , χ
a
kla
), we have a conjunction of disjunctions
between two S-elements with consecutive indexes as
∧kla−1
i=1 sχai ∨ ¬sχai+1 .
B is defined by
n∧
a=1
kla−1∧
i=1
sχa
i
∨ ¬sχa
i+1
. (2)
C : This group of clauses is split in two. For any list la = (χ
a
1 , . . . , χ
a
kla
),
the first sub-group C1 contains all the clauses defined by the logic formula∧kla−1
i=1 yχai → sχai ∧ ¬sχai+1 . With a CNF notation, it leads to
∧kla−1
i=1 (¬yχai ∨
sχa
i
)∧ (¬yχa
i
∨¬sχa
i+1
). Note that, C1 also covers the special case, when i = kla .
C1 is defined by
n∧
a=1
kla∧
i=1
(¬yχa
i
∨ sχa
i
) ∧
kla−1∧
i=1
(¬yχa
i
∨ ¬sχa
i+1
)
. (3)
The second sub-group C2 has three specific cases according to the position
of elements in the ordered lists. As fixed above, each element of χ appears in
exactly two different lists. Thus, for any e ∈ χ, there exists two lists la and lb
such that χai = χ
b
j = e, where i ∈ [1, kla ] and j ∈ [1, klb ]. For each couple of
elements of χ denoted by (χai , χ
b
j) that are equal to the same value e, we define
a clause with these elements and the next elements in their lists respecting
the ordering: sχa
i
→ yχa
i
∨ sχa
i+1
∨ sχb
j+1
. With a CNF notation it leads to:
(¬sχa
i
∨ yχa
i
∨ sχa
i+1
∨ sχb
j+1
).
We add the two specific cases where χai or χ
b
j , or both are the last elements
of their ordered lists. The complete formula for the set of clauses C2 for each
two element (χai , χ
b
j) s.t. χ
a
i = χ
b
j is:
C2

∧
i 6= kla , j 6= klb
¬sχa
i
∨ yχa
i
∨ sχa
i+1
∨ sχb
j+1∧
i 6= kla , j = klb
¬sχa
i
∨ yχa
i
∨ sχa
i+1∧
i = kla , j = klb
¬sχa
kla
∨ yχa
kla
(4)
D : Similarly to C2, for each couple of elements of χ denoted by (χ
a
i , χ
b
j) equal
to the same value e, there exists a clause with these elements and the previous
elements in their lists respecting the ordering: pχa
i
↔ ¬sχa
i
∧ sχa
i−1 ∧ sχbj−1 . With
a CNF notation, it leads to:
(¬pχa
i
∨¬sχa
i
)∧ (¬pχa
i
∨sχa
i−1)∧ (¬pχai ∨sχbj−1)∧ (sχai ∨¬sχai−1 ∨¬sχbj−1 ∨pχai )
By generalizing the formula for any couple, and by adding the two cases
where χlai , or χ
lb
j , or both are the first elements of their respective lists, the
complete formula D for each two element (χai , χ
b
j) s.t. χ
a
i = χ
b
j = e is described
by:
D

∧
i 6= 1, j 6= 1
(¬pχa
i
∨ sχa
i−1) ∧ (¬pχbj ∨ sχbj−1)∧
(sχa
i
∨ ¬sχa
i−1 ∨ ¬sχbj−1 ∨ pχai )∧
i = 1, j 6= 1
(¬pχb
j
∨ sχb
j−1
) ∧ (sχa
i
∨ ¬sχa
j−1 ∨ pχai )∧
i = 1, j = 1
sχa
1
∨ pχa
1
∧ ¬pe ∨ ¬se
(5)
To conclude the definition, the full CNF formula of SAT-SM is A ∧ B
∧ C1 ∧ C2 ∧ D .
Lemma 2. There always exist some clauses of minimum length 4 that are de-
fined over positive literals in A .
Proof. For any list of ordered elements la ∈ {l1, l2, . . . , ln}, the length of each
list is defined as kla ≥ 2 in SAT-SM, which results in A having n clauses that
have at least 4 positive literals in each. 
Lemma 3. There always exist some clauses of length 2 that are defined over
two negative literals in C .
Proof. The clauses in C consists of two groups. The first group is defined over
the list of ordered elements. For any two consecutive elements in a list la ∈
{l1, l2, . . . , ln}, there exists two clauses:
∨kla−1
i=1 (¬yχai ∨ sχai ) ∧ (¬yχai ∨ ¬sχai+1).
By definition, the minimum length of an ordered list la is kla = 2 and therefore
the minimum-length list yields in 2 clauses of the defined form. Therefore, the
first group includes 2×∑a∈{1,...,n}(kla − 1) clauses. 
Lemma 4. Any clause defined over only positive literals of size at least two is
not affine.
Proof. Any clause C of the given form with k positive literals have 2k − 1 valid
assignments. The cardinality of an affine relation is always a power of 2 [13].
Thus, C is not affine. 
The SAT-SM problem is the question of finding an assignment of the Boolean
variables that satisfies the above CNF formula.
Theorem 2. The SAT-SM problem is NP-complete.
Proof. We use Schaefer’s dichotomy theorem (Theorem 1) to prove that SAT-SM
is NP-complete [13]. Schaefer identifies six cases, where if any one of them is
valid the SAT problem is solved in polynomial time. Any SAT formula that does
not satisfy any of those 6 is NP-complete.
It is easy to see the properties a, d, and f in Schaefer’s Dichotomy do not ap-
ply to SAT-SM due to Lemma 2. Similarly, properties b and c are not satisfiable
because of Lemma 3. The clauses in A are defined as clauses over positive liter-
als and it is known that they always exist by Lemma 2. By applying Lemma 4
on the clauses in A , we infer that property e is not applicable either. Hence,
SAT-SM is NP-complete. 
We can now present the main result of the paper.
Theorem 3. The decision problem piF2 is NP-complete.
Proof. The verification is shown to be polynomial-time decidable [7]. Therefore,
piF2 is in NP. We show that piF2 is NP-complete by presenting a polynomial
reduction from the SAT-SM problem to piF2 as follows.
From an instance ISSM of SAT-SM, we construct in polynomial time an
instance I of piF2 . This means the construction of the rotation poset ΠF =
(VF , EF ) with all stable pairs in the rotations, and the preference lists.
We first start constructing the set of rotations VF and then proceed by decid-
ing which man is a part of which stable pair in which rotation. First, ∀e ∈ χ, we
have a corresponding rotation ρe. Initially, each rotation contains two “empty”
pairs. Second, ∀la, a ∈ [1, n],∀χai ∈ [1, kla ], we insert ma as the man to the first
empty pair in rotation ρχa
i
. Since kla ≥ 2 from Lemma 2, Each man of piF2 is
involved in at least two rotations (satisfying Property 4).
As each χai appears in exactly two different lists la and lb, each rotation is
guaranteed to contain exactly two pairs involving different menma,mb (Property
1), and to possess at most two predecessors and two successors in ΠF (Property
2).
For the construction of the set of arcs EF , for each couple of elements of χ
denoted by (χai , χ
a
i+1), a ∈ [1, n],∀i ∈ [1, kla − 1], we add an arc from ρχai to
ρχa
i+1
. Note that this construction, yields in each arc in E representing a type 1
relationship (Property 3 and Property 4). Because each arc links two rotations,
where exactly one of the men is involved in both rotations. Now, in order to
complete the rotation poset ΠF , the women involved in rotations must also be
added. The following procedure is used to complete the rotation poset:
1. For each element χa1 ∈ χ, with a ∈ [1, n], let ρχa1 be the rotation that
involves man ma. In this case, the partner of ma in ρχa1 is completed by
inserting woman wa, so that the resulting rotation contains the stable pair
〈ma, wa〉 ∈ ρχl
1
.
2. We perform a breadth-first search on the rotation poset from the completed
rotations. For each complete rotation ρ = (〈mi, wb〉, 〈mk, wd〉) ∈ VF , let ρs1
(resp. ρs2) be one of the successor of ρ and modifying mi (resp. mk). If
ρs1 exists, then we insert the woman wd in ρs1 as the partner of man mi.
In the same manner, if ρs2 exists, we insert the woman wb in ρs2 as the
partner of man mk. The procedure creates at most two stable pairs 〈mi, wd〉
and 〈mk, wb〉 (see the illustration in Figure 2.D). From the fact that each
woman wb appears in the next rotation as partnered with the next man of
the current rotation ρ, in the SAT-SM definition it is equivalent to going
from χiy to χ
k
z+1 on lists where χ
i
y = χ
k
z , y ∈ [1, n], z ∈ [1, n − 1]. Thus the
path where the woman appears follow a sequence defined as the one in [Rule
1] from the SAT-SM definition. By this rule, we can conclude that Lemma 1
is satisfied.
All along the construction, we showed that all the properties required, to
have a valid rotation poset from the family F, are satisfied. Using this process
we are adding equal number of women and men in the rotation poset.
The last step to obtain an instance I of piF2 is the construction of the pref-
erence lists. By using the rotation poset created above, we can construct incom-
plete preference lists for the men and women. Gusfield et. al. define a procedure
to show that every finite poset corresponds to a stable marriage instance [15].
In their work, they describe a method to create the preference lists using the
rotation poset. We use a similar approach for creating the lists as detailed below:
– Apply topological sort on VF .
– For each man mi ∈ [1, n], insert woman wi as the most preferred to mi’s
preference list.
– For each woman wi ∈ [1, n], insert man mi as the least preferred to wi’s
preference list.
– For each rotation ρ ∈ VF in the ordered set, for each pair 〈mi, wj〉 produced
by ρ, insert wj to the man mi’s list in decreasing order of preference ranking.
Similarly, place mi to wj ’s list in increasing order of preference ranking.
The Lemma 1 imposed on our rotation poset clearly involves that each pref-
erence list contains each member of the opposite sex at most once. To finish, one
can observe that the instance obtained respects the Stable Marriage require-
ments and the specific properties from problem family F.
⇐ Suppose that there exists a solution to an instance I of the decision prob-
lem piF2 . Then we have a (1, 1)-supermatch and its corresponding closed subset
S. As defined in Section 2, L(S) is the set of leaf nodes of the graph induced
by the rotations in S, N(S) the set of nodes such that all their predecessors are
in S but not themselves. From these two sets, we can assign all the literals in
ISSM as follows:
– For each rotation ρi ∈ L(S), set yi = true. Otherwise, set yi = false.
– For each rotation ρi ∈ S, set si = true. Otherwise, set si = false.
– For each rotation ρi ∈ N(S), set pi = true. Otherwise, set pi = false.
If S represents a (1, 1)-supermatch, that means by removing only one rotation
present in L(S) or by only adding one rotation from N(S), any pair of the
corresponding stable matching can be repaired with no additional modifications.
Thus any men must be contained in a leaf or a neighbor node. This leads to
having for each man one of the literals assigned to true in his list in SAT-SM.
Therefore every clause in A in Equation 1 are satisfied. Therefore every clause
in A are satisfied.
For the clauses in B in Equation 2, for any man’s list the clauses are forcing
each si literal to be true if the next one si+1 is. For the clauses in B , for any
man’s list the clauses are forcing each si literal to be true if the next one si+1 is.
By definition of a closed subset, from any leaf of S, all the preceding rotations
(indexes in the lists) must be in S. And thus every clause in B is satisfied.
As the clauses in C altogether capture the definition of being a leaf node of
the graph induced by the rotations in S, they are all satisfied by L(S). At last,
for the clauses in D , it is also easy to see that any rotation being in N(S) is
equivalent to not being in the solution and having predecessors in. Thus all the
clauses are satisfied.
Thus we can conclude that this assignment satisfy the SAT formula of ISSM .
⇒ Suppose that there exists a solution to an instance ISSM of the decision
problem SAT-SM. Thus we have a valid assignment to satisfy the SAT formula
of ISSM . We construct a closed subset S to solve I. As previously, we use the
sets L(S) and N(S), then for each literal yi assigned to true, we put the rotation
ρi in L(S). We are doing the same for pi and si as above.
The clauses in B enforce the belonging to S of all rotations preceding any
element of S, thus the elements in S form a closed subset. To obtain a (1, 1)-
supermatch, we have to be sure we can repair any couple by removing only one
rotation present in L(S) or by only adding one rotation from N(S). The clauses
in C enforce the rotations in L(S) to be without successors in S. And in the
same way the clauses in D enforce the rotations in N(S) to not be in S but
have their predecessors in the solution.
Now we just have to check that all the men are contained in at least one
rotation from L(S) ∪ N(S). By the clauses from A , we know that at least one
ye or pe for any manmi is assigned to true. Thus from this closed subset S, we can
repair any couple 〈mi, wj〉 in one modification by removing/adding the rotation
having mi. Since there exists a 1− 1 equivalence between a stable matching and
the closed subset in the rotation poset, we have a (1, 1)-supermatch. 
Corollary 1 From the Theorem 3 and by generality, both decision problems pi1
and pi2 are NP-complete.
5 Concluding Remarks
We study the complexity of the Robust Stable Marriage (RSM) problem. In order
to show that given a Stable Marriage instance, deciding if there exists an (a, b)-
supermatch is NP-complete, we first introduce a SAT formulation which models
a specific family of Stable Marriage instances. We show that the formulation is
NP-complete by Schaefer’s Dichotomy Theorem. Then we apply a reduction
from this problem to prove the NP-completeness of RSM.
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